A common justification for abortion is the argument from bodily autonomy. It is reasoned that a woman—and only a woman—has the right to decide how her body is going to be used. If she does not want to share her body with her developing child, she has the right to rid her body of it, even if that requires she kill it. In fact, a common mantra of abortion-choice advocates is “my body, my choice.”
Much could be said as to why bodily autonomy is not a good justification for abortion rights, but I do not wish to focus on that here. Instead, I would like to focus on a tactical way to expose the bodily autonomy argument for what it is: a sham. Let me show you how.
Only the most ardent of abortion advocates believe in unrestricted abortion through the entire nine months of pregnancy. Most abortion advocates draw the line somewhere, even if they differ on the precise location. Some will say abortion is no longer permissible once the baby reaches viability (roughly 23 weeks). Others draw the line at seven months. Others draw it at partial birth abortion. Wherever the line is drawn, the fact that a line is drawn between morally permissible and morally impermissible abortions demonstrates that the argument for the moral permissibility of abortion from bodily autonomy is an ad hoc, rather than principled argument. Here’s why.
A woman owns her body during the entire pregnancy. She does not cease to own her body after the second trimester, seventh month, or whatever line one wishes to draw. She owns her body once that line is crossed, just as she did before that line was crossed. If the justification for abortion is that a woman owns her body, and she owns her body during the entire pregnancy, then to forbid her to choose an abortion at any time during that pregnancy is to violate her bodily autonomy. If she wishes to rid her body of the child, she can do so whenever, and however she wants to—that is, if bodily autonomy is an absolute right. But if her bodily autonomy can be denied when X obtains, then clearly the right to bodily autonomy is not absolute, and thus cannot serve as the grounding for abortion rights. Bodily autonomy may be normative, but there are circumstances in which it should be superseded by weightier rights/values.
One might wonder, then, if bodily autonomy is not absolute, and can be superseded when set against X, why is it that a woman’s bodily autonomy trumps the life of the unborn early in pregnancy, but not later in pregnancy? Why does the child’s right to life trump the mother’s bodily autonomy when the child is eight months old, but not when she is three months old? Such questions put the focus where it ought to be: the unborn. If your opponent wishes to make an ontological and/or moral distinction between an early and late fetus, they need to demonstrate how exactly it is that they differ. And guess what, there is no ontological or moral distinction between the two!
How would this logic play out strategically in a debate with an abortion advocate? Let me illustrate.
After your opponent has used the argument from bodily autonomy as a justification for abortion, ask
1. “Are there any abortions you are opposed to?”
If he names some X—and he is likely to do so—ask him to justify that restriction in light of his previous justification for abortion: bodily autonomy. Ask
2. “Do the bodies of women no longer belong to them when X obtains?”
I would imagine our opponent would respond by quickly acquiescing that the woman’s body still belongs to her, but then add a quick but. He will agree that a woman’s body still belongs to her even when X obtains, but the presence of X is sufficient to override her bodily autonomy.
At that point say
3. “If X can supersede a woman’s bodily autonomy, then bodily autonomy is obviously not absolute, and thus cannot serve as the ultimate justification for abortion rights.”
Go on to ask
4. “If one’s bodily autonomy can be superseded by X, why can’t one’s bodily autonomy be superseded by the presence of another living human being in her womb?”
He will have to offer up a justification for why X can trump a woman’s bodily autonomy, but Y does not. And as sure as I am alive, the justifications he will give (size, level of development/function, degree of dependency, etc.) are all morally irrelevant to how we treat human beings.
HT: Intellectual inspiration for this argument came from Jivin Jehoshaphat
January 26, 2008 at 5:16 pm
The question here is whether your right to bodily autonomy allows you to use your body in ways that hurt other bodies. If a man has the right to use his body in whatever way he chooses, even when it touches the body of another, then rape is morally justified. “My body, my choice,” indeed.
January 28, 2008 at 4:30 pm
I agree. Of course, abortion advocates will argue that the unborn is not a person like an adult women involved in rape is, so the same does not apply. But they need to defend this philosophical claim rather than assuming it, and that’s a losing ticket.
Or they will argue that it is morally significant that the unoborn is inside the mother’s body, rather than external to it as in the example you provided. Of course, they have to show how location is morally relevant. That, too, is a losing ticket.
Jason